a cryptography coding standard

?

because even experts make mistakes

$\leftarrow \rightarrow$	C https://code.google.com/p/keyczar/source/diff?spec=svn065963b698dcd0eb85d16	e3ef6eb	4e75dee3f52c&r=065963b698dcd0eb85d16e3ef6eb4e75dee3f52 🔍 🔿 👜 🝙 🏠 😓
TZO	Initisign();	124	Initional ();
126	}	125	}
127		126	
128	public void sign(ByteBuffer output) {	127	public void sign(ByteBuffer output) {
129	<pre>output.put(hmac.doFinal());</pre>	128	<pre>output.put(hmac.doFinal());</pre>
130	}	129	}
131	•	130	
132	public void updateSign(ByteBuffer input) {	131	<pre>public void updateSign(ByteBuffer input) {</pre>
133	hmac.update(input);	132	hmac.update(input);
134	}	133	}
135		134	
136	<pre>public void updateVerify(ByteBuffer input) {</pre>	135	<pre>public void updateVerify(ByteBuffer input) {</pre>
137	updateSign(input);	136	updateSign(input);
138	}	137	}
139	3	138	5
140	public boolean verify(ByteBuffer signature) {	139	<pre>public boolean verify(ByteBuffer signature) {</pre>
141	byte[] sigBytes = new	140	byte[] sigBytes = new
	byte[signature.remaining()];	110	<pre>byte[signature.remaining()];</pre>
142	signature.get(sigBytes);	141	signature.get(sigBytes);
143	Signature.get(Sigbytes),	142	51ghatare.get(51gb)(65),
144	<pre>return Arrays.equals(hmac.doFinal(), sigBytes);</pre>	143	<pre>return Util.safeArrayEquals(hmac.doFinal(),</pre>
144	return Array <mark>s.e</mark> quats(nmac.uorinat(), sigbytes),	145	sigBytes);
145	۱	144	1
	1		1
146	5	145	3
147	3	146	3

because even experts make mistakes

If the encoding operation outputs "message too long," output "message too long" and stop. If the encoding operation outputs "intended encoded message length too short," output "RSA modulus too short" and stop.

4. Compare the encoded message *EM* and the second encoded message *EM'*. If they are the same, output "valid signature"; otherwise, output "invalid signature."

```
RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
     const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num)
int i,j;
const unsigned char *p;
p=from;
if ((num != (flen+1)) || (*(p++) != 01))
    RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_01);
    return(-1);
/* scan over padding data */
j=flen-1; /* one for type. */
for (i=0; i<j; i++)
    if (*p != 0xff) /* should decrypt to 0xff */
        if (*p == 0)
            { p++; break; }
        else
            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,RSA_R_BAD_FIXED_HEADER_DECRYPT):
            return(-1);
            }
    p++;
if (i == j)
    RSAerr(RSA F RSA PADDING CHECK PKCS1 TYPE 1,RSA R NULL BEFORE BLOCK MISSING);
    return(-1);
```



OpenSSL v1.0.1c

lots of mistakes (SANS top 25 software errors)

Porous Defenses

The weaknesses in this category are related to defensive techniques that are often misused, abused, or just plain ignored.

CWE ID	Name
CWE-306	Missing Authentication for Critical Function
CWE-862	Missing Authorization
CWE-798	Use of Hard-coded Credentials
CWE-311	Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data
CWE-807	Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision
CWE-250	Execution with Unnecessary Privileges
CWE-863	Incorrect Authorization
CWE-732	Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource
CWE-327	Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm
CWE-307	Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts
CWE-759	Use of a One-Way Hash without a Salt

we need some rules

ULES 1. YOU CAN.... 2. YOU CAN'T ... 3. YOU CAN 4. YOU CAN'T

checklists are simple and effective




Figure GEN-1. Normal Takeoff and Departure

 $\leftarrow \rightarrow \mathbb{C}$ \square spinroot.com/p10/

The Power of Ten 10 Rules for Writing Safety Critical Code

1	Restrict to simple control flow constructs.	<u>(details)</u>
2	Give all loops a fixed upper-bound.	<u>(details)</u>
3	Do not use dynamic memory allocation after initialization.	<u>(details)</u>
4	Limit functions to no more than 60 lines of text.	<u>(details)</u>
5	Use minimally two assertions per function on average.	<u>(details)</u>
6	Declare data objects at the smallest possible level of scope.	<u>(details)</u>
7	Check the return value of non-void functions, and check the validity of function parameters.	<u>(details)</u>
8	Limit the use of the preprocessor to file inclusion and simple macros.	<u>(details)</u>
9	Limit the use of pointers. Use no more than two levels of dereferencing per expression.	<u>(details)</u>
10	Compile with all warnings enabled, and use one or more source code analyzers.	<u>(details)</u>

Based on: "The Power of Ten -- Rules for Developing Safety Critical Code," IEEE Computer, June 2006, pp. 93-95 (PDF).

JPL DOCID D-60411

Rule Summary

Rule Summary				
1 Lang	1 Language Compliance			
1	Do not stray outside the language definition.			
2	Compile with all warnings enabled; use static source code analyzers.			
2 Predi	2 Predictable Execution			
3	Use verifiable loop bounds for all loops meant to be terminating.			
4	Do not use direct or indirect recursion.			
	Do not use dynamic memory allocation after task initialization.			
*6	Use IPC messages for task communication.			
7	Do not use task delays for task synchronization.			
*8	Explicitly transfer write-permission (ownership) for shared data objects.			
9	Place restrictions on the use of semaphores and locks.			
10	Use memory protection, safety margins, barrier patterns.			
11	Do not use goto, setjmp or longjmp.			
12	Do not use selective value assignments to elements of an enum list.			
3 Defensive Coding				
13	Declare data objects at smallest possible level of scope.			
14	Check the return value of non-void functions, or explicitly cast to (void).			
15	Check the validity of values passed to functions.			
	Use static and dynamic assertions as sanity checks.			
*17	Use U32, I16, etc instead of predefined C data types such as int, short, etc.			
	Make the order of evaluation in compound expressions explicit.			
19	Do not use expressions with side effects.			
4 Code	4 Code Clarity			
20	Make only very limited use of the C pre-processor.			
21	Do not define macros within a function or a block.			
22	Do not undefine or redefine macros.			
23				
*24	Place no more than one statement or declaration per line of text.			
*25	Use short functions with a limited number of parameters.			

Secure Coding Guidelines for the Java Programming Language, Version 4.0

- Introduction
- 0 Fundamentals
- 1 Denial of Service
- 2 Confidential Information
- 3 Injection and Inclusion
- 4 Accessibility and Extensibility
- 5 Input Validation
- 6 Mutability
- 7 Object Construction
- 8 Serialization and Deserialization
- 9 Access Control
- Conclusion
- References

Security > Home > Writing Secure Code


Writing Secure Code

One of the key things that developers can do to help secure their systems is to write code that can withstand attack and use security features properly. This page contains links to best practices and how-to articles on writing secure code.

Getting Started

- The Security Development Lifecycle Process
- 10 Security Tips: Defend Your Code with Top Ten Security Tips Every Developer Must Know
- Lessons Learned from Five Years of Building More Secure Software
- Security Compliance as an Engineering Discipline
- An Overview of Security in the .NET Framework
- Web Application Security Fundamentals

plenty of resources



but much less for crypto



where can I find the coding rules of OpenSSL (if any)?

🛧 Reply 🛍 Delete 🔺 Favorite

7:07 PM - 6 Jan 13 · Embed this Tweet

Reply to @aumasson



Shhhhhhh @greenestfield 7m @aumasson Rule #1 of the OpenSSL coding rules: you don't talk about the OpenSSL coding rules.

Details



Adam Langley @agl_____5m @aumasson I just make it look like the surrounding code. I dream someday that we can run indent over it.

Details

the closest I found

nacl.cr.yp.to/internals.html

compiled together. You can use external names prefixed by the implementation name: for example, crypto_hash/sha512/c crypto_hash_sha512_core2_iv, crypto_hash_sha512_core2_expand, etc.

Branches

Do not use secret data to control a branch. In particular, do not use the memcmp function to compare secrets. Instead use crypt crypto_verify_32, etc., which perform constant-time string comparisons.

Even on architectures that support fast constant-time conditional-move instructions, always assume that a comparison in C is com conditional move. Compilers can be remarkably stupid.

Array lookups

Do not use secret data as an array index.

Early plans for NaCl would have allowed exceptions to this rule inside primitives specifically labelled vulnerable, in particular crypto_stream_aes128vulnerable, but subsequent research showed that this compromise was unnecessary.

Dynamic memory allocation

Do not use heap allocators (malloc, calloc, sbrk, etc.) or variable-size stack allocators (alloca, int x[n], etc.) in C N

Thread safety

Do not use global variables (i.e., static variables or variables defined outside functions) in C NaCl.

Alignment

Do not assume that the input arrays or output arrays have any particular alignment. If you want to use, e.g., an aligned 16-byte lo

starting this project after I had to write my own crypto coding rules...

inspiration: PTES

C www.pentest-standard.org/index.php/Main_Page

Page



Navigation

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Main Page

Welcome to the Penetration Testing Execution Standard homepage. This will be the ultimate home for the penetration For more information on what this standard is, please visit:

• The Penetration Testing Execution Standard: FAQ

High Level Organization of the Standard

 Note: This is the BETA RELEASE. We have had TONS of interest from many members of the security communi where we were at. This effort has been going on since November 2010 and has had over 1800 revisions. The lin we are at today.

What we are looking for out of this release:

-Gain help from people who understand the direction of the map and will be willing to document the methods used to branches

-Take feedback and comments form the community on improvements

-Identify the next phase in terms of defining "levels" for each of the sections.

-Create teams to tackle writing our the formal standard


-Create tools to address the gaps identified during the creation of the Standard

-And most of all, put an end to the poorly defined term Penetration Test!

checklists by experienced professionals

Threat Modeling

This phase details the elements that are part of the threat modelling (based on the intelligence gathered and the pre-engagement information) Following is an image depicting the main branches of the corresponding mindmap:



similar motivations

Q: Is this going to be a formal standard?

A: We are aiming to create an actual standard so that businesses can have a baseline of what is needed when they get a pentest as well as an understanding of what type of testing they require or would provide value to their business. The lack of standardization now is only hurting the industry as businesses are getting low-quality work done, and practitioners lack guidance in terms of what is needed to provide quality service.

how should this look like for crypto?

Continued

Internet crypto

This is the page for the research retreat **Internet crypto** by the <u>VAMPIRE</u> lab of <u>ECRYPT</u>. The meeting starts on Monday, Jan 21, 2013 at 14:00 afternoon of Tuesday, Jan 22, 2013 (when the main event takes over). The meeting is public, registration for the main conference, <u>Crypto for 2020</u> Early registration ends January 8, 2013. The fees are 225 EUR for early registration and 325 EUR for late registration. This should encourage eve early! There are some stipends available to students from Europe, for details, conditions, and deadlines see the <u>registration page</u> of the main even

This event is a research retreat, this means it's not the time to read your email or do other normal work, this is high-quality collaboration time. Yo nicest islands that Europe has to offer and your task is nothing but to work with the other people who come for the same meeting. To give this some framework we've invited a nice list of active people who care about security-relevant software on the internet and who will pre approaches to fix the Internet - or some parts thereof - and asked them to outline in 30 min what would be a useful that this research retreat (and fc do. We might also hear some horror stories of completely broken parts.

So, bring your laptops and a lot of motivation. Here is the list of invited participants who will give short presentations (which most likely define t meeting):

- Jean-Philippe Aumasson
- <u>Matthew Green</u>
- Nick Mathewson
- <u>Peter Schwabe</u>
- Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn