

#### **SECURE COMMUNICATIONS: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE**

Jean-Philippe Aumasson

#### **THE SPEAKER**

- PhD in cryptography from EPFL & FHNW, 2009
- Principal Cryptographer at Kudelski Security
- Designed popular algorithms: SipHash, BLAKE2
- Talked at Black Hat, DEFCON, RSA, etc.
- Designed and reviewed secure com technos
- http://aumasson.jp https://twitter.com/veorq



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#### SECURE <u>COMMUNICATIONS</u>

Internet-based communications, over-IP

VolP

- Real-time text + data, instant messaging-like
- Asynchronous text + data, email-like
- Out of scope: PSTN phone, satphones, radio coms, etc.

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#### **SECURE COMMUNICATIONS**

### Confidentiality of the content

□ Is it securely encrypted? Who has the keys?

#### Privacy and anonymity of parties

□ Who talks with whom? What is stored by the provider?

#### Authentication of parties and content

Am I sure I talk with Alice? Were messages modified?

#### Assurance and confidence

Can designers be trusted? How secure is the software?



#### WHY SHOULD WE CARE?

- Corporate espionnage, especially when traveling
- Nation-state agencies surveillance and recording
- Reduce need for trust in ISPs, admins, etc.
- Mere desire for privacy




## **Past:** 1980s–2012



#### 1980-1990

#### Bulletin boards, email, IRC; no security





PUBLIC

7

#### 1991: PGP

Confidentiality and authenticity of files, emails

#### No forward secrecy, no/low anonymity

#### **Complex and error prone**

-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.16 (Darwin)

hQEMA6/xAsCXZgJNAQgAmwcXEirKcYPH1JGTG6i/yrQdJ2fBmOFPqnUNcDHzz8h5 87OE1mWMSnfRbC8dR7kuDcJPeIDc0fEKtOrNMgiKTGHJ5dmDw9uQsjwSpSeq2LAP tOqxTDSbfFDXG+V0O4xhJAAab4u+fhQcDirxCdyrFETeOpZg5VsVaLj0E42vHE0R T46JyKgv5wQHkdQ95FDkrFTxNKTIQC1cVUbnYUlgpquUcl72Bfu8lNiNdBunnohO ABH5n0uK+awPi+V6zdV1vulhaGRtcwEDiwfKspeUv8L+i39Es1NhB1d0gpPfArFv X4uNTxUL82IWUG6lSKNf1xx0UD7GnauasjdXzbt0VtLA1QHI0zb9e76si62xxGYm X4gyjZWem5B+I+IZszWBrR8nylgJDR/wDiOb9/E2Nse/FRnxrnmI99sfJby8BG7Q q8GID/Od8RYGBg+bc1RwBPbdscJICeOzPtiGmdtiTYz5i+m91GKDRnd1VF744IKu Fc2mKdUld4Kt190pVfN7zfgY2m2WQ6JqBCIUSEchY+CXNxqZz9GzxSE3xAerrqEe wo/PQc2wirgbZq++pdMOLNE5tAc044JyOzxWuuxEcxb4QH7/OIETrWaiKjyAVyJZ WCfpRfW/QVOnyB0EntEhyLOiIhfe6s1gSK2KpVJgVhoLO5wrdyYkwMGDXuidm7X/ zO8FlwvFM/jUpfvfAO2w9gmadf0n2YThny56qIuU8YKooUQyg6mNv1g9jqWYIODL QMbDjrgLvD3ezfyC4BMqvB1MGKTRhSFTIx5+mPCPdHGBXVxmzZossYOsj+9UfH0d epH7zQ4PgtLDKQ58sRfhWvcSLVIhvIRJkYS8UP/9Jw1OGcoZWvGMyy7xw5w6Dext DUslpXXTeQ==

=h8Fg

-----END PGP MESSAGE-----

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
#### **INSTANT MESSAGING SYSTEMS**

ICQ, AIM, Gaim/Pidgin, MSN, Jabber, Google talk, etc. Commercial corporate solutions

### Little or no concern for security

- At best client-server encryption
- Frequent protocol and software flaws









#### 2003: SKYPE

Initially based on a peer-to-peer network

2005 audit: standard algorithms, proprietary protocol Acquired by MS in 2011 (...) NSA eavesdropping...





#### **2004: OFF-THE-RECORD (OTR) PROTOCOL**

#### End-to-end encryption, forward secrecy

Runs on top of existing messaging protocols

Trusted by Snowden to chat with journalists

#### Off-the-Record Communication, or, Why Not To Use PGP

Nikita Borisov UC Berkeley nikitab@cs.berkeley.edu Ian Goldberg Zero-Knowledge Systems ian@cypherpunks.ca

Eric Brewer UC Berkeley brewer@cs.berkeley.edu

#### 2004: SRTP

"Secure RTP", encrypted VoIP (RFC 3711)

Specs on how to protect RTP packets

#### First step towards secure VoIP

The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)

Status of this Memo

This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.








#### 2006: ZRTP

## **End-to-end encrypted VolP**

#### MitM defense: **SAS** and **key continuity**

#### No PKI, implicit user authentication



#### 2009: WHATSAPP

One of the first popular mobile messaging apps

Initially low security, proprietary protocols...





# Present: 2012–2015





PUBLIC

16


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#### IMPACT

New secure voice/chat/email app every week Some innovative protocols and secure apps, but also... Opportunistic and profit-driven systems, often lower-quality Ditto for well-intended but inexperienced developers

#### Better awareness and understanding

Efforts in terms of **UI and usability** 

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20

#### **CRYPTOCAT**

Web and mobile chat, free and open-source

Software reviewed and audited

OTR for 2-party chats, custom group protocol

<b>ERYPTOCAT</b>		
conversation	name	
nickname	connect	
Enter the name of a convers	ation to join.	




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#### **THREEMA**

Swiss, end-to-end encryption, good track record

Explicit identity verification (QR codes scan)

Not open-source, partial forward secrecy only





22

#### **SILENT CIRCLE**

- Commercial products from PGP/ZRTP inventor
- ZRTP-based VoIP
- "SCIMP" messaging protocol, OTR-inspired



Blackphone device integrating Silent Circle apps


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#### **OPEN WHISPER SYSTEMS**

- Free & open-source mobile apps, solid engineering
- **ZRTP-based voice**
- "Axolotl ratchet" messaging protocol, OTR-inspired






#### PEERIO

Email-like messaging and file sharing, end-to-end

Browser extensions, mobile apps coming

Minimized user interaction with security parameters





25

#### **MORE MESSAGING APPS**

#### 40 listed on <a href="https://www.eff.org/secure-messaging-scorecard">https://www.eff.org/secure-messaging-scorecard</a>





# Future 2016+




#### WHAT WILL CHANGE...

More bandwidth for audio and video content


More users of mobile devices

More platforms (watches, etc.)



#### **EXPECT... LESS FRAGMENTATION**

#### Most usable and beautiful apps will survive





#### **EXPECT... REGIONAL DIFFERENCES**

#### **Different apps** will dominate different markets

# Due to different usage, culture, regulations, preference for local apps, etc.





微信,超过四亿人使用,能够通过手机网络给好友发送语音消息、文字消息、表情、图片和视频,还可以分享照片到朋友圈。通过摇一摇、直看附近的人,你可以认识新的朋友。使用扫一 扫,你可以扫描二维码。你还可以在游戏中心玩游戏,与公众号互动...

R

#### 基本特性: - 发送语音、图片、文字、表情、视频消息,与朋友聊天变得简单有趣, - 群聊,并可以将群组保存到微信通讯录中。 - 朋友圈,与朋友分享生活的每一个骚问。

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


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#### **EXPECT... UNIFICATION**

Voice, messaging, and video in a **single app** 

Same app in mobile platforms and (mobile) browsers



#### **EXPECT... BETTER INTEGRATION**

#### In corporate and professional environments

- Industry-specific, such as health or finance
- Features for compliance, accountability, auditability





#### **EXPECT... MORE COMMERCIAL APPS**

Due to more popular demande for privacy

Usually better marketing and usability than FOSS

Tends to favor time to market over security



Secure Cyber Dust sends fully encrypted messages

Fast

Speedy service at your finger tips



**Blast Messages** Media Send a text or photo to all of Send as many high quality photos your friends at once as you want



World Wide Cyber Dust is available World Wide

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#### **EXPECT... MORE GROUP/SOCIAL INTEGRATION**

Social network services will use stronger messaging

#### Secure group communications is a challenge

# Facebook introduces PGP encryption for sensitive emails

Users of the social network can now opt to encrypt email notifipassword resets and other confidential information





#### Open Whisper Systems partners with WhatsApp to provide end-to-end encryption

moxie0 on 18 Nov 2014

At Open Whisper Systems, our goal is to make private communication simple. For the past three years, we've been developing a modern, open source, strong encryption protocol for asynchronous messaging systems, designed to make seamless end-to-end encrypted messaging possible.



#### **EXPECT... VULNERABILITIES AND ATTACKS**

#### On the software, infrastructure, users

- "Bug bounty" initiatives helping bugs discovery
- Increasing cost of breaking into mobile platforms...



# Conclusions



#### **ON THE TECHNICAL SIDE**

We know the theoretical recipe of secure systems

#### But...

- DoS/fallback attacks are effective
- Operational security is also important
- Metadata can leak critical information
- Secure app on a compromised system is insecure
- Secure coms solutions are just a part of a system



#### **ON THE BUSINESS SIDE**

Plenty of vendors, affordable/free mobile solutions...

#### But...

- Technically state-of-the-art solutions not mature as products Unclear security of corporate-friendly, commercial systems Non-interoperability limits adoption and effectiveness You may want/need hardware-based security
- The right solution depends on your assets, threats, platform(s), size, etc.
- Buy actual security, not a feeling of security



38



# **THANK YOU!**

www.kudelskisecurity.com cyber security unit of Kudelski Group